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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT-IMMUNITY EXCEPTION PROVI-
SIONS OF § 1330(A)-HARRIS CORP. V. NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO &
TELEVISION
On February 22, 1978, plaintiff Harris Corporation entered into
a contract with defendant National Iranian Radio and Television
(NIRT) to manufacture and deliver broadcast transmitters to
Iran.' To facilitate payment on the underlying contract, Harris and
the defendant, Bank Melli Iran,2 structured a two-tiered letter of
credit agreement. Harris obtained a standby letter of credit in
favor of Melli s and Melli issued a performance guarantee letter of
credit4 in favor of NIRT, the latter to be paid if Harris failed to
perform the underlying contract.'
During February 1979 revolutionaries overthrew the Imperial
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982).
The contract required Harris to deliver 144 FM broadcast transmitters to Teheran, Iran,
and to provide related training and technical services. Id. at 1346.
2 Bank Melli is completely operated by the Government of Iran. Iranian banks were na-
tionalized in June 1979. As of early 1983, Bank Melli, one of Iran's largest state-owned
banks, had over 1,760 branches in Iran and 11 branches abroad. THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA: 1982-83 (1983).
' Any letter of credit arrangement normally involves at least three parties: 1) the issuer,
or the bank opening the credit; 2) the customer, or the person who causes the bank to issue
the credit, and 3) the beneficiary, or the person entitled to draw or demand payment under
the letter of credit. Effros, Current Legal Matters Affecting Central Banks, 13 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 621, 622 (1983). Essentially, a standby letter of credit is issued to secure the
customer's performance of an obligation owed to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is entitled
to draw on the letter of credit only if the customer fails to fully perform the underlying
contract between the original parties to the business transaction. In some situations, as in
Harris, the issuing bank may be asked to name another bank (i.e., Bank Melli in Harris) as
the beneficiary of the credit. The second, or beneficiary, bank will then issue an additional
standby letter of credit in favor of the original beneficiary, normally the government agency
negotiating with the customer. See id. at 623; Comment, Enjoining the International
Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189, 192-
93 n.25 (1980).
' Both the letters of credit issued by Melli and by Continental Bank are actually standby
letters of credit. In order to distinguish the two letters of credit, the court refers to the letter
of credit issued by Melli as a performance guarantee. Harris, 691 F.2d at 1346.
' In the instant case, the performance guarantee provided that Melli (the issuer) would
pay NIRT (the beneficiary) any amount up to $674,035.20 (ten percent of the face value of
the contract) upon Melli's receipt of NIRT's written declaration that Harris (the customer)
had failed to comply with the terms of the underlying contract. Id.
The letter of credit structure described in Harris is typical of commercial transactions
involving Middle Eastern governments. For a discussion of these so-called "suicide" standby
letters of credit, see Comment, supra note 3, at 196-200.
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Government of Iran. In November 1979, seizure of the United
States embassy in Iran led to the United States' promulgation of
the Iranian Assets Control Regulations.' The Regulations prohib-
ited Harris from delivering the final shipment of transmitters.
NIRT informed Melli that Harris had breached the underlying
contract. In June 1980, Melli telexed Continental Bank, issuer of
Harris' standby credit, that NIRT had demanded payment under
Melli's performance guarantee. Melli demanded payment from
Continental on Harris' standby letter of credit.' Harris then filed
suit in federal court seeking to enjoin (1) NIRT from making a
demand on Melli, (2) Melli from paying NIRT under the guaran-
tee, and (3) Melli from receiving payment from Continental under
the standby letter of credit." The district court granted preliminary
injunctive relief1 ° and defendants NIRT and Melli appealed assert-
ing, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction under applicable immunity pro-
visions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act section
1330(a)(FSIA)." Held, affirmed. The exercise of jurisdiction over
the agency of a foreign state is proper under the immunity excep-
' In response to the Iranian seizure of the United States Embassy in Teheran, President
Carter declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979 and blocked the removal or
transfer of Iranian assets or property from the United States. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3
C.F.R. § 457 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981). The Iranian Assets Con-
trol Regulations implemented the President's order by preventing shipment to Iran of all
nonessential goods. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-904 (1981).
Harris, 691 F.2d at 1348. The court notes that under the terms of the Assets Control
Regulations, sellers were required to obtain special licenses on a case-by-case basis before
exporting goods. Harris alleged that it was advised by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
that special licenses would be issued only in emergency situations or for humanitarian rea-
sons and would not be issued for the transmitters. Id.
8 Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1349. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted
a temporary restraining order (TRO) on June 13, 1980, pending a hearing on Harris' motion
for a preliminary injunction. On June 16, 1980, a copy of the TRO was delivered to Melli's
counsel. On June 20, 1980, three days after receipt of the TRO, despite the restraint against
payment, Melli telexed Continental that it had paid the full amount of the guarantee after
receiving NIRT's written demand about Harris' alleged non-compliance with the terms of
the underlying contract. The telex also reiterated the demand that Continental pay Melli
the amount of the standby letter of credit. Id. at 1349.
" Harris, 691 F.2d at 1344. The preliminary injunction: 1) enjoined NIRT from demand-
ing payment on the performance guarantee; 2) enjoined Melli from making payment on the
guarantee and from demanding payment on the standby letter of credit; 3) directed Harris
to maintain a blocked account in the amount of the letter of credit ($674,035.20) in accor-
dance with the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.568 (1980); 4) enjoined
removal of any funds from the blocked account; and 5) directed the attachment of the
blocked account for Harris' benefit. Id.
" Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330; 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4); 1391(f); 1441(d); and 1602-1611 (1976)) (FSIA).
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tion provisions of FSIA section 1330(a) when the agency maintains
an office in the United States and demands payment under a letter
of credit agreement negotiated with a United States corporation,
because such commercial activities provide sufficient minimum
contacts with the United States. Harris Corp. v. National Iranian
Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982).
A foreign state and its agents are generally immune to the juris-
diction of United States courts under the FSIA."2 Pursuant to
FSIA section 1330(a), however, a federal court may exercise juris-
diction over a foreign state's if the state's commercial activities
meet the requirements of FSIA sections 1605-160714 or those of an
applicable international agreement. 5 Immunity waiver provisions
are typically included in commercial treaties to which the United
12 Historically, the principle of foreign sovereign immunity prevented United States
courts from hearing cases involving either public or private acts of a foreign state. See The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1912). By the 1920's the increase
in which foreign states engaged in commercial (or private) activities necessitated a change in
the traditional adherence to the principle of absolute immunity. See T. GUrTTARI, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 8-9 (1970).
In 1952, the State Department officially adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Phillip B.
Perlman, Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
Under this theory, immunity is limited to public acts of a foreign state. Hill, A Policy Anal-
ysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1982).
Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976 intending that the statute codify the restrictive the-
ory, transfer the responsibility of deciding pleas of immunity to the judiciary, and clarify
procedures for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6607 [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
For further discussion of United States foreign sovereign immunity see generally Carl,
Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1980); Rabinowitz, Can the Courts Cope with
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 1 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 130, 132-33
(1979-80); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 22 (1978).
"3 The FSIA definition of a "foreign state" includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. 1603(a).
14 In addition to the commercial activity exceptions of § 1605, FSIA § 1606 limits the
extent of a foreign state's liability and FSIA § 1607 establishes the requirements for coun-
terclaims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). In fact, the statutory provisions of the FSIA and the immunity
exceptions clause of an international agreement may work in conjunction with each other.
Section 1605(a)(1) provides for an exception to immunity when a foreign state waives its
immunity either explicitly or implicitly. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). The legislative history of the
FSIA indicates that a treaty waiver clause could be construed as an explicit waiver under §
1605(a)(1). HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6617. Thus, a domestic plaintiff could invoke a
treaty waiver clause in order to establish a statutory immunity exception under § 1605(a)(1).
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States is a party. 6 For example, one of the immunity exceptions at
issue in Harris is from the 1957 Treaty of Amity, Economic Rela-
tions, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran
(Treaty of Amity). 17 Article XI, section 4 of the Treaty provides:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party. . . which is en-
gaged in commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activi-
ties within the territories of the other High Contracting party
shall claim or enjoy, either for itself or its property, immunity
therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment, or other liabil-
ity to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are sub-
ject therein.'"
This waiver provision of the Treaty reflects United States commit-
ment to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by denying
the immunity defense to agencies of the sovereign government
when those agencies engage in activities of a commercial nature.'l
Perhaps because the Treaty simply restates the restrictive immu-
nity concept, no court has addressed the scope of the jurisdiction
which section 4'provides.
In addition to the treaty waiver exception, FSIA section 1330(a)
provides for waiver of immunity through the statutory exceptions
of sections 1605-1607.20 The most significant of these sections is
the commercial activity exception (section 1605(a)(2)) which
provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States . . . in any case . . . in which the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
16 The typical commercial treaty is referred to as a treaty of friendship, commerce and
navigation. Although such treaties are an intricate part of international diplomacy, "they
are fundamentally economic and legal ... , concerned with the protection of persons, natu-
ral and juridical, and of the property and interests of such persons." Walker, Modern Trea-
ties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 806 (1958). For exam-
ples of United States commercial treaties containing immunity waiver clauses, see UNITED
NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND
THEIR PROPERTY 131-34 (1982).
" Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Amity].
18 Id. art. XI, § 4.
'8 See T. GUIrrARI, supra note 12, at 316; S. SUCHARITKEL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING
ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 196-98 (1959).
2o 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
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United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States .... 2
The final clause of this section, which purports to reach acts occur-
ring outside of the United States that have a direct effect in the
United States, is of instant concern.
Before a court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1605(a)(2), it must first determine whether the foreign state's
commercial activity is sufficiently connected to both the cause of
action and to the United States.22 The final clause of section
1605(a)(2) requires courts to interpret two ambiguous phrases: "di-
rect effect" and "in the United States. '23 If the foreign state's com-
mercial activity causes an effect that is both sufficiently "direct"
and "in the United States," subject matter jurisdiction exists.24
Judicial analysis of the phrase "direct effect" initially developed
in the context of personal injury litigation. In Upton v. Empire of
Iran,25 United States citizens living in Iran were injured by the col-
lapse of an Iranian airport roof.2" The District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia reasoned that the "direct effect" contemplated
by the FSIA must be one "which has no intervening element, but,
rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption. '27
The Upton court held that the direct effect was the injury which
the plaintiffs sustained in Iran; any effect in the United States,
such as the plaintiff's suffering, was merely consequential.2 8
" 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2).
22 Duffy, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the Second Circuit After Texas Trading and
Verlinden, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 979 (1982).
11 See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig. 647 F.2d 300, 311-13 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). The FSIA provides no definition of the phrase
"direct effect in the United States." The House Report implies that the direct effect clause
of § 1605(a)(2) is to be interpreted consistently with the principles set forth in Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1965). HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6618. Section
18 of the Restatement provides that in cases based on conduct not generally recognized as a
crime or tort, the effect within the territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory. Section 18, however, only specifies
the circumstances under which a state may "prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). Section 18, therefore, does not establish
a binding standard, only a guide for determining the definition of "direct effect."
24 Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 313.
2 Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 414
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
26 Id. at 264.
27 Id. at 266.
28 Id.
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Additional definition of the direct effect clause was given in Har-
ris v. VAO Intourist.29 In VAO Intourist, a case involving the
death of a United States citizen in a Moscow hotel fire, a New
York district court reasoned that a "direct effect" must have sub-
stantial and foreseeable impact in the United States.30 The court
noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Upton, the victim of the Mos-
cow fire did not even suffer in the United States, nor did he use
any United States medical facilities. 1 The New York court, there-
fore, ruled that the death of a United States tourist in Moscow did
not cause a direct effect in the United States. 2
The direct effect clause was most recently analyzed in Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.33 In that
case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the first time applied
section 1605(a)(2) to a corporate plaintiff. Although Upton and
VAO Intourist had defined "direct effect" in the context of per-
sonal injury suits, interpreting this phrase as applied to an intangi-
ble corporate plaintiff was much more complex.
Texas Trading involved Nigeria's breach of certain contracts
and letters of credit that the Government of Nigeria had negoti-
ated with a group of United States corporations." The court stated
that the relevant inquiry in defining "direct effect" was whether
the United States corporation has suffered a financial loss. 3 5 The
corporate plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the breached contracts
and letters of credit, thus, the Texas Trading court ruled that the
financial loss they suffered was a "direct effect" within the mean-
ing of section 1605(a)(2).3 6
After a court determines that the foreign defendants' acts have
caused a direct effect within the meaning of section 1605(a)(2), it
must decide whether that direct effect satisfies the second phrase:
"in the United States." The phrase "in the United States" reflects
Congress' desire that traditional due process requirements limit
the broad jurisdictional authority conferred by section 1605(a)(2).3 '
29 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
0 Id. at 1065.
:I Id.
02 Id.
" Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 300.
s4 Id.
' Id. at 312,
' Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on an earlier Second Circuit opinion,
Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979). There, the court decided that a
direct effect could result from the cancellation of a contract for the sale of oil.
"7 The House Report states that the requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts are
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The defendant must "purposefully avail" itself of the benefits of
transacting business in the United States before due process re-
quirements are satisfied. 8 In determining that constitutional due
process requirements were satisfied, the Texas Trading court re-
lied on two facts: first, the defendant's actions prevented plaintiffs
from collecting money in the United States and, second, each
plaintiff was a United States corporation. 9 An attempt to locate
the exact site of injury to a corporation would be difficult because
of the nature of the corporate structure;40 thus, the judiciary in
corporate cases must be more flexible in construing the "in the
United States" phrase of section 1605(a)(2).41 The facts of this
case, the court felt, satisfied this more flexible standard.
The Harris court addressed both types of immunity provided by
FSIA section 1330(a) because the plaintiff invoked the FSIA com-
mercial activity exception of section 1605(a)(2) and the immunity
exception provision of the Treaty of Amity. The court initially dis-
cussed the scope of the immunity waiver provision of the Treaty of
Amity.'2 Melli argued that the Treaty of Amity must be read as
providing for a territorial transactional waiver, requiring a nexus
between the United States and the commercial activity sued
upon.43 According to Melli, such a restrictive reading was necessary
to prevent an overly-expansive use of the international agreement
exception provided for in FSIA section 1330(a)."
The Harris court rejected Melli's argument on three grounds.
First, the court noted that the language of the FSIA and its legisla-
tive history indicated that the jurisdictional requirements of a
treaty provision are to be determined independently from those of
sections 1605-1607.' 5 Second, the court found that the Treaty of
Amity conferred jurisdiction using a "doing business" type of test,
embodied in the FSIA. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6612.
" See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Den-
kla, 357 U.S. 253 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a
discussion of the minimum contacts standard in the area of personal jurisdiction, see H.
SCHACK, JURISDICTIONAL MINIMUM CONTACTS SCRUTINIZED (1983), Green, Federal Jurisdic-
tion in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961); Kamp,
Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L.
REV. 19 (1980).
" Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 312.
40 Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 313.
" Id. at 312.
42 Harris, 691 F.2d at 1350; Treaty of Amity, supra note 17, art. XI, § 4.
" Harris, 691 F.2d at 1350.
I d.
I4 d.
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which Melli satisfied through its substantial business activities in
New York .4  Finally, the court stated that a restrictive reading of
the immunity exception provided for in the Treaty of Amity was
unnecessary because the Constitution and statutes limit the exer-
cise of jurisdiction under section 1330(a).4 7 Jurisdiction over defen-
dants under the Treaty was, therefore, proper.
Having found one basis for jurisdiction under the Treaty waiver
provision, the court asked whether the immunity exception which
the direct effect clause of FSIA section 1605(a)(2) provides could
be applied as an alternative jurisdictional basis. The essential
question was whether the effect of Melli's demand for payment
was sufficiently "direct" and sufficiently "in the United States" to
permit a federal court to hear the case."' The court answered that
question affirmatively, noting that the letter of credit arrangement
extended into the United States, and that Melli's demands trig-
gered the entry of a blocked account on Harris' books, discharging
the letter of credit.4 9 Applying the Texas Trading financial loss ra-
tionale,50 the Harris court found that the effect of Melli's demands
could be a financial loss to Harris. That effect was sufficiently con-
nected with the United States to satisfy section 1605(a)(2).5 1
The final question confronting the court was whether the exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction over Melli was consistent with the
due process requirement of minimum jurisdictional contacts.5 2 Sat-
isfaction of due process involves an examination of the quality and
nature, rather than the quantity, of activities in which the foreign
11 Id. at 1352-53. See supra note 32. The doing business test referred to by the court
requires that the activities be continuous and substantial in nature. There is no general
requirement that the activities be related to the act sued upon. H. SCHACK, supra note 38, at
37-38. See also Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 242 U.S. 437 (1952).
" Harris, 691 F.2d at 1352-53.
48 Id. at 1351 (quoting Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 313). The Harris
court did not analyze the phrase "commercial activity" because Melli's activities were
clearly commercial in nature. Id.
49 Harris, 691 F.2d at 1351.
50 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
" Harris, 691 F.2d at 1351.
12 Since the suit involved a domestic corporation and a foreign defendant, the appellate
court in Harris held that the diversity jurisdiction clause of article III of the Constitution
granted the district court power to hear the case. Id. at 1352. The court also affirmatively
resolved the issue of whether the personal jurisdiction requirements of § 1330(b) were met.
Section 1330(b) grants statutory personal jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction
under § 1330(a) is established and service has been made under § 1608. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
Noting that both defendants had received actual notice (Melli did not challenge service of
process), the court found that § 1608 requirements were met and § 1330(b) jurisdiction
could be exercised. Id.
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defendant engages while transacting business in the forum state. 3
The defendant's conduct and connection within the forum state
must be substantial enough for the defendant to reasonably antici-
pate being subject to suit in the forum state.54 The court first ex-
amined the nature of Melli's activities in the United States. Melli
had maintained an active office in New York since 1969 and had
emphasized the commercial significance of its New York office in
its filings with New York banking authorities. 5 Additionally, the
letter of credit transaction required substantial performance in the
United States.5 6 On these facts, the court concluded that Melli had
"purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the United States" and, thus, constitutionally could be subject
to suit in the United States.5 7
From both a legal and a policy standpoint, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's conclusion in Harris was the result of a practicable analysis
of the immunity exception provisions of the FSIA. While the
court's decision is consistent with existing judicial interpretation of
FSIA section 1330(a), it also enlarges upon the previous decisions.
Although Harris presented the difficult task of analyzing the direct
effect exception of section 1605(a)(2) and the immunity exception
clause of the Treaty of Amity, the court developed a compact legal
analysis that clarifies some of the jurisdictional requirements of
both of the immunity exceptions provided by section 1330(a).
Harris is the first decision in which a court substantively ana-
lyzes the contacts required for the exercise of jurisdiction under
the waiver provision of a commercial treaty." In Harris, the court
reasoned that the invocation of a treaty waiver provision under
section 1330(a) necessitated a jurisdictional contacts analysis inde-
5 International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
5 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286.
Harris, 691 F.2d at 1353.
" Id.
57 Id.
58 In Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J.
1979) and E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980),
the federal court did confront the waiver clause of the Treaty of Amity with Iran. In both
cases, however, the courts' focus was on the availability of prejudgment attachments under
the treaty provision. Neither court addressed the jurisdictional requirements of the Treaty's
waiver provision.
In Irving Trust Co. v. Government of Iran, 85 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1980), a United States
bank sued a foreign government to enforce the terms of a letter of credit. Although the
court dealt mainly with the plaintiff's request for a writ of attachment under FSIA §
1610(d), the court did state that Iran had expressly waived immunity under the 1957 Treaty
of Amity.
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pendent of the contacts requirements of sections 1605-1607. 59 Such
a holding is clearly in accord with FSIA section 1604, which makes
the FSIA subject to all international agreements existing at the
time of the FSIA's enactment.6 By refusing to apply FSIA con-
tacts standards retroactively to the Treaty's provision, the Harris
court effectuated the drafters' intent that the Treaty provide
broad protection to United States business transactions with
Iran."
Concluding that the appropriate test for jurisdiction under the
Treaty is a "doing business" type of test,62 the Harris court de-
cided that the contacts relied upon to demonstrate a foreign defen-
dant's connection with the United States need not relate to the
cause of action." Thus, courts may look to a wider range of the
Harris, 691 F.2d at 1350. For a further discussion of the court's analysis of the Treaty's
waiver provision, see supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
60 Section 1604 provides: "Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
01 As shown in the court's analysis of the direct effect clause of § 1605(a)(2), the FSIA
standards for sufficient transactional contacts requires more than the general, unrelated
contacts sufficient to satisfy a doing business test. See supra text accompanying notes 17-35.
The drafters of the Treaty, however, intended that the immunity waiver provision operate
as an expansive jurisdictional base. One Senator commenting on the Treaty with Iran noted:
Establishment of a comprehensive basis for the protection of American commerce
and citizens, and their business and other interests in the underdeveloped areas
should be an incentive to our citizens to aid in the development of those areas.
Insofar, therefore, as such treaties can be negotiated with underdeveloped coun-
tries, the interests of the United States are advanced. The Iranian treaty affords a
substantial degree of protection to American citizens, -enterprises, and products.
102 CONG. REC. 12,287 (1956)(Statement of Senator George). Thorston Kalijarvi, Deputy
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs at the time the Treaty was drafted, noted that the
political expendiencies involved in negotiations with underdeveloped countries such as Iran
necessitate the use of uncomplicated treaties. Hearings on Executive E Before the Senate
Comm. of Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1956). The language of the Treaty was
intended to be simple in order to encourage investment in Iran, yet provide maximum pro-
tection to those United States citizens ultimately engaging in business transactions with
Iran.
:2 Harris, 691 F.2d at 1350. See supra note 46.
03 See supra note 46. The doing business test as a basis for jurisdiction has not gone
uncriticized. One commentator has noted that "a corporation's doing business as a general
contact, i.e., unrelated to the cause of action, is comparable with mere presence and just
another fossil which is clinging tenaciously to life." H. SCHACK, supra note 38, at 37. One
reason, however, for the continued use of the doing business test is the difficulty in distin-
guishing related contacts from unrelated ones. Related contacts are weighted more heavily
in favor of jurisdiction; thus, a single related contact may be sufficient. The problem lies in
analyzing what the phrase "related to the controversy" means when trying to establish fo-
rum contacts. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 82. In contrast, courts applying the doing business test
406
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foreign defendant's activities to establish subject matter jurisdic-
tion. On the issue of sufficiency of contacts with the United States
in Harris, the court emphasized that Melli maintained an active
New York office and that the business transaction in question re-
quired substantial performance in the United States."' The court
found Melli's contacts to be sufficient for jurisdiction,65 because
the "doing business" type of test does not require that the contacts
relate to the act sued upon."6
In the final part of its analysis of the Treaty's waiver provision,
the court stated that the possibility of an over-expansive exercise
of jurisdiction under the Treaty provision is more properly con-
strained by the Constitution than by a restrictive reading of the
Treaty's waiver provision.17 Had the court accepted Melli's argu-
ment for a narrow reading of the Treaty provision, it would not
have had to analyze due process requirements.6 " The court, how-
must establish more forum contacts, but the court need not involve itself in a sometimes
theoretical, and often perplexing, analysis of whether those contacts are related to the act
sued upon. See id.
64 Actually, the court delays discussion of the sufficiency of contacts until it addresses the
due process requirements for personal jurisdiction. See Harris, 691 F.2d at 1352-53. Al-
though this is not a major problem, the court's analysis could have been clarified by discuss-
ing the minimum contacts in the context of the treaty provision analysis.
6 Most courts have held that any activities of the defendant, so long as the activities are
continuous and substantial in nature, are sufficient to satisfy the doing business test. See H.
SCHACK, supra note 38, at 37-39. One such activity often recognized as sufficient is the exis-
tence in the forum of an office owned by the defendant. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Air India, 393
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1968); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 625
(1965). Additionally, the courts have generally taken an expansive approach to determine
whether contract performance within the forum is sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Market & Distribution Resources, Inc. v. Paccar, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 990 (D. Mass.
1978); Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Machine, 14 Ill. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E.2d
27 (1973). Thus, in Harris, the combined activities of Melli could be construed as providing
sufficient contacts with the forum. But see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 46.
6 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. The court also notes that § 1330(b) requires
that adequate service of process be made under § 1608. This limitation is merely procedural
and does not provide an effective limitation on the court's exercise of jurisdiction. Moreover,
§ 1330(b) provides an automatic basis for in personam jurisdiction once the requirements of
§ 1330(a) are met. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Thus, the constitutional constraints recognized by
the court are clearly the more effective limitations on jurisdiction.
6 While all jurisdictional tests are inherently subject to due process scrutiny, if the court
can deny subject matter jurisdiction first, then there is no need to examine forum contacts
in light of due process requirements. In Harris, the contacts relied on are sufficient to estab-
lish jurisdiction under the doing business test, but are only tenuously related to Melli's
demand for payment under the letter of credit. Thus, under Melli's test, the court might not
have reached the due process issues because the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction
(i.e., establishing specific, related contacts) would not have been satisfied. Had Melli's con-
tacts been sufficiently related to the demand for payment, then the court would have been
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ever, examined due process requirements separately from the juris-
dictional requirements established by the language of the Treaty.
The result is a clarified analytical process for application of a
treaty waiver provision that is fair to the defendant, yet not un-
duly burdensome for the courts to apply.69
The court next examined the statutory immunity waiver provi-
sion provided in the final clause of section 1605(a)(2). In contrast
to its lack of precedential guidance in analyzing the treaty provi-
sion, the court was able to rely on at least one prior holding to
interpret the direct effect clause of section 1605(a)(2).1° The Harris
court cited Texas Trading and applied a two-pronged test, sepa-
rately examining "direct effect" and "in the United States."'" The
Harris court's adoption of this two-pronged test provides for an
ordered analysis of the minimum contacts standard required by
section 1605(a)(2). 72 Thus, Harris not only reaffirms the analytical
guidelines established in Texas Trading, but it also expands the
type of transactional contacts sufficient under section 1605(a)(2).
The court in Texas Trading had found that the defendant's breach
of letter of credit agreements allowed it to apply the direct effect
clause of section 1605(a)(2). In contrast, the Harris court focused
required to examine those contacts under due process standards.
" The Harris court noted that the exercise of jurisdiction under the Treaty provision
"should only involve determining whether the activities engaged in by the enterprise of a
foreign state in the United States are the type that should subject it to litigation in domes-
tic courts." Harris, 691 F.2d at 1351. Thus, under the doing business test applied by the
court, the requirements of minimum contacts and due process are incorporated to ensure
that the defendant is fairly subject to jurisdiction. Moreover, the test applied in Harris does
not require a determination of relatedness, only an inquiry into the quality of forum con-
tacts. As a result, a court applying a similar treaty waiver provision need only 1) examine
the quality of forum contacts, and 2) apply the personal jurisdiction requirements of §
1330(b) and due process to those forum contacts.
70 E.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 300; VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. at
1056; Upton, 459 F. Supp. at 264.
" See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
72 Analysis of the phrase "direct effect" ensures that the injury suffered by the plaintiff
was substantially and proximately caused by the foreign defendant. Analysis of the phrase
"in the United States" ensures that the act sued upon has sufficient connection with the
United States so as not to offend the constitutional requirements of due process. Together,
these two phrases illustrate the legislative intent that the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions be
limited by the requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts. HOUSE REPORT, supra note
12, at 6612. Adoption of the two-pronged test enables the judiciary to examine each prob-
lematic phrase separately and, thus, establish workable standards for each part. Like a jig-
saw puzzle, once each part of the clause is defined, the pieces may be fitted together to
create a uniform picture of the minimum contacts required by § 1605(a)(2).
71 See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. See also Carey v. National Oil Corp.,
592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (suggesting that cancellation of contracts for sale of oil involves
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on the defendant's demand for payment under the letter of credit
agreement to determine whether the effect in the United States
was sufficiently direct. Under Harris, then, the foreign defendant
may be subject to jurisdiction without breaching an agreement; the
defendant's demand for payment on a letter of credit which is pay-
able in the United States is a sufficiently direct effect to satisfy
section 1605(a)(2).
The Harris court's finding of sufficient minimum contacts in
such a situation is not unprecedented. As Justice Brennan noted in
Shaffer v. Heitner,74 the judiciary is "concerned solely with 'mini-
mum' contacts, not the 'best' contacts. '75 This comment does not
imply that minimal contacts are sufficient;76 however, the range of
contacts acceptable under due process requirements in the domes-
tic sphere has broadened." The increasing number of international
commercial disputes indicates that a similarly flexible standard
should be applied when determining jurisdiction under the FSIA.
Indeed, Congress intended that the FSIA contain a broad mini-
mum contacts standard so that plaintiffs harmed by foreign states
would have greater access to the federal court system.7 Through a
broad approach to the issue of minimum contacts, Harris ap-
proaches a uniform79 standard of minimum contacts for interna-
direct effect where corporate buyer is located).
7' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
18 Id. at 228.
16 H. SCHACK, supra note 38, at 15. For a critical analysis of the range and type of contacts
relied on by state and federal courts, see H. SCHACK, supra note 38; Brilmayer, supra note
63; Kamp, supra note 38.
" In earlier decisions, the judiciary read the FSIA narrowly and required that the defen-
dant be physically present in the United States before sufficient minimum contacts were
found to exist. See, e.g., Carey v. National Petroleum Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979);
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
In contrast, the state courts recognized that advances in technology made the requirement
of defendant's physical presence superfluous. See Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach &
Machine, 14 Ill. App. 3d 365, 304 N.E. 2d 27 (1973)(single business transaction initiated by
nonresident defendant by telephone sufficient to authorize exercise of personal jurisdiction);
Parke-Barnat Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 608 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970) (foreign
defendant who was active participant in auction as result of open telephone line had en-
gaged in purposeful activity, thus properly subject to jurisdiction within forum state).
18 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12.
Legislative history indicates that a uniform jurisdictional standard was intended to be
applied under the FSIA "since a disparate treatment of cases involving foreign governments
may have adverse foreign relations consequences." HoUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6611.
See Note, Minimum Contacts Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 209, 229-30 (1982).
The determination of jurisdictional issues on a case-by-case basis, however, combined
with the relatively small amount of litigation arising under the FSIA, hampered the creation
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tional litigation that should prove more useful than the earlier,
more restrictive standards applied to the FSIA.80
In addition to being consistent with prior rulings, the court's
conclusion in Harris is good policy. Increasing instances of political
upheaval abroad require more flexibility in granting plaintiffs ac-
cess to the federal court system.81 By applying the treaty provision
and the direct effect exception of section 1605(a)(2) less restric-
tively, the Harris court establishes a realistic yet equitable stan-
dard for interpretation of FSIA section 1330(a).
Although Harris offers a commendable treatment of a very com-
plex area of international law, the opinion does have weaknesses.
For example, the "doing business" test for application of the im-
munity waiver provision of the Treaty of Amity is easily satisfied.82
Melli's business activities in New York provide a single contact
with the United States which is arguably unrelated to the cause of
action. Melli's involvement in the business transaction relates to
the act sued upon, but the court failed to explain what constituted
substantial performance.8 Typically, bank involvement in letter of
credit transactions is limited to documentary verification of, rather
than actual participation in, the performance of the underlying
contract.8 4 Thus, if the court is referring to substantial perform-
of a consistent minimum contacts standard. See Delaume, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 640 (1980).
The cautious approach adopted by the earlier courts may have been based on the fact
that the FSIA granted the judiciary a power that previously had belonged to the executive
branch. See supra note 12. The courts may have been hesitant to apply the broad jurisdic-
tional mandate contained in the FSIA in deference to the executive's past practice of exam-
ining the political considerations involved in the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign state.
It was the express intent of Congress, however, that the responsibility for determining sov-
ereign immunity issues rest solely with the judiciary. HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6604-
06.
o See supra note 77.
81 The Iranian situation exemplifies the problems plaintiffs may encounter when attempt-
ing to gain judicial relief from a foreign defendant. The court in Harris pointed out in its
discussion that Harris' ability to pursue a legal remedy within Iran had been precluded.
Harris, 691 F.2d at 1356. See generally Comment, supra note 3, at 227-33.
82 See H. SCHACK, supra note 38, at 37-40. Noting that because the doing business test
requires only general unrelated contacts, Dr. Schack concludes that the requirement that
such activities be continuous and substantial is not an effective restriction. He goes on to
state: "Doing business as a general contact has outlived its utility. It is superfluous, ex-
tremely vague, triggers circumventions by the plaintiff, and may, finally, have the effect of
creating undue burdens on interstate commerce." Id. at 39. Although Dr. Schack refers to
the possible burdens on interstate commerce, his reasoning is equally applicable to com-
merce between two sovereign nations. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
83 Harris, 691 F.2d at 1353.
"' U.C.C. § 5-114 comment 1 (1978).
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ance of the underlying contract, Melli's involvement appears to
provide only an attenuated contact with the United States. 5
The simple language of the Treaty's waiver provision supports
the court's conclusion that only a "doing business" type of test is
required. 6 Commercial treaties, however, are drafted primarily to
increase trade and investment; thus, the drafters probably did not
intend for the Treaty's waiver provision to be applied broadly.8 7
Using unrelated contacts as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction
may create a disincentive to foreign investment and trade. Addi-
tionally, the broader exercise of jurisdiction may complicate nego-
tiations of subsequent commercial treaties with foreign states.8
The court's method of analysis creates some ambiguities. Most
notably, the analysis appears to subsume one prong of the test re-
quired by the direct effect exception of section 1605(a)(2). After
stating that it will separately analyze "direct effect" and "in the
United States," the court blurs the distinction between these
phrases.8 9 Although its end result is correct, the court's failure to
clearly address the phrase "in the United States" confuses its anal-
ysis of the minimum contacts issue. In view of the importance of a
" Alternatively, the court could be referring to the fact that Continental Bank was to pay
Melli in the United States. It has been noted, however, that payment "is a single act,
quickly accomplished." WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 171 (2d ed.
1980). As such, it is doubtful that payment could constitute substantial performance.
" See supra note 61.
"7 The provisions of the Treaty were intended to be reciprocally applied to each con-
tracting party. 102 CONG. REC. 12,287 (1956). In view of this reciprocity, a broad application
of the waiver may result in a more expansive reaction by foreign courts in exercising juris-
diction over United States defendants. Consequently, a United States corporation may be
less inclined to invest in the treaty party's country, despite the drafter's goal of increasing
trade and investment by providing a broad waiver provision. The same reasoning would
apply to a foreign state seeking to invest in the United States.
88 Foreign countries seeking to negotiate a commercial treaty with the United States may
well use the United States judiciary's broad jurisdictional interpretations as a bargaining
tool. As a result, future commercial treaties may be more restrictively worded in the waiver
provisions or, in the worst case, no mutually satisfactory provision could be adopted.
89 The court's adoption of the two-pronged test implies that the court intended to analyze
each phrase separately. Instead, the court answers the question in two sentences:
The letter of credit arrangement-which was structured according to the wishes of
the appellants-extends into this country, and the appellants' demands thus have
significant, foreseeable financial consequences here. This sufficiently establishes a
"direct effect" within the meaning of § 1605(a)(2).
Harris, 691 F.2d at 1351. While one can discern the court's general analytical approach, the
language and structure of this section of the Harris decision is not as precise as the ap-
proach adopted in Texas Trading. The Harris court appears to hold that the "in the United
States" requirement was satisfied by the fact that the letter of credit agreement extended
into the United States. The language of the court's opinion, however, makes this point
debatable.
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uniform minimum contacts standard, the Harris court should have
clearly identified its factual basis for concluding that Harris' finan-
cial loss was sufficiently in the United States.
With its decision in Harris, the Eleventh Circuit has provided a
progressive, if somewhat problematic, analysis that addresses but
does not master, the jurisdictional issues presented by the FSIA.
Theoretically, the FSIA should provide statutory answers to all ju-
dicial questions in a civil suit against a foreign state. 0 In actuality,
the FSIA is an ambiguous legislative scheme-a statutory laby-
rinth through which the courts may wander in a variety of inter-
pretive directions 1 Thus, if the FSIA is to effectuate the exercise
of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the judiciary must work
toward establishing a clear and uniform interpretation of the stat-
ute's requirements. Harris does not definitively interpret the im-
munity exception provisions of section 1330(a). Harris does, how-
ever, adequately define a transactional contacts standard for
section 1330(a) that is crucial to the continued viability of the
FSIA. Under its guidelines, United States businesses faced with fi-
nancial loss due to the wrongful act of a foreign state can look for-
ward to more favorable jurisdictional standards and, thus, greater
likelihood of relief in the future.
Melanie Howell
o See supra note 12.
" "The FSIA ... owing to the numerous interpretive questions engendered by its bizarre
structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a
financial boon for the private bar, but a constant bane of the federal judiciary." Gibbons v.
Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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